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23 July 1979

West Europe Report

(FOUO 43/79)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF SEEN BACKING PSF'S ROCARD TO TOPPLE MITTERRAND

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 4 Jun 79 p 18

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "Wearing Down Mitterrand"]

[Text] The PCF also chooses Rocard against Mitterrand to defeat the socialist candidate in 1981 and to become again the leading party of the left.

Aside from politics, men are now involved in the quarrel between socialists and communists. On Thursday, in an official communique, the executive bureau of the PS [Socialist Party] referred clearly to the attitude of Georges Marchais during the occupation. Mentioning Willy Brandt, the socialists noted especially that he "can learn no lesson from anyone, including the present leadership of the [French] Communist Party concerning resistance against the Nazis."

More explicit, Pierre Joxe confided:

"Francois Mitterrand never went into the Obligatory Labor Service."

On 23 May, on Radio-2, Marchais cast doubt on the personal soundness of the first secretary of the Socialist Party. With an anecdote.

In substance: on 6 May 1974, immediately after the first round of voting in the presidential election, Mitterrand and Marchais were said to have met in the Montparnasse Tower where Mitterrand had set up his headquarters for the presidential campaign. The communist chief was then said to have consoled the only leftist candidate, allegedly distressed by his defeat in the first round. He stated the following:

"He was distraught and I was the one who told him that it was necessary to fight."

Two days before this statement, the secretary general of the PCF participated in a meeting with his Italian counterpart, Enrico Berlinguer, in Turin. He tried to stick on Mitterrand the image of the eternal loser:

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"Francois Mitterrand represents permanent defeat," he said. "In 1965, we made him the single candidate of the left. He failed. In 1978, victory was within reach. At the last moment, Francois Mitterrand abandoned the union policy."

This case brought up against Mitterrand is one of the facets of the strategy that the communists seem to be trying to deploy between now and the 1981 presidential election.

Among the possible socialist candidates, Mitterrand is the one who can most easily win over communist voters. The 1965 and 1974 elections accustomed the PCF voters to vote for him in the first round. And the leftist political line adopted by the socialist leader in the Metz congress (there, he allied himself with Ceres) is a denial of the accusations of a turn to the right made for over a year by the communists.

Mitterrand has not yet made a decision on his own candidacy. The campaign of discredit launched by the communists is tending to deter him from running.

The possibility of blackmail is open here. By attacking the socialist leader personally, the PCF leads implicitly to the belief that it will put out the watchword of "six of one, half a dozen of the other" with which Jacques Duclos dissuaded the communist voters, in 1969, from choosing between Georges Pompidou and Alain Poher, with regard to Mitterrand between the two rounds of the presidential election. This attitude would practically deprive Mitterrand of any chance of being elected and perhaps even of running.

At the same time, Michel Rocard (silent for the last 2 months) is spared by the communist attacks. That is the second facet of the PCF strategy. The deputy from Yvelines is said to be a better candidate for the PCF than Mitterrand in the presidential election. Because of his political profile.

The social-democrat image that Rocard has in public opinion hardly enables him to hope to attract communist voters to him. Therefore, his candidacy would give Marchais a chance to fill up with his usual voters. And the "drift to the right" embodied in the PS -- rightly or wrongly -- by Rocard would justify a refusal to withdraw in favor of the communist candidate.

The press has its place in this debate. Especially LE MATIN. Several times, the daily edited by Claude Perdriel seemed to favor Rocard. He made a front page headline of the case against Mitterrand. Evidently to defend to socialist leader.

"But, at the same time, he echoed the incident widely," they are saying in Mitterrand's circle of friends.

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It is also being observed there that, the other week, LE MATIN published a poll from which it emerged that a majority of socialist voters were hoping for a rapprochement by their party with the UDF [French Democratic Union]. That lent credit to the image of a social-democrat PS. And that would consolidate the communist strategy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

STYLES OF WEIL, MARCHAIS, MITTERRAND, CHIRAC COMPARED

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 1 Jun 79 pp 32, 33, 79

[Article by Arthur Conte]

[Text] Simone Weil is conducting what one could call an "exact" campaign. She is doing strictly what has to be done to fully win such a competition. However, she has a certain number of handicaps. For example, she could have dreamed of heading a more lively or more popular slate. In the arena, she does not have the same "expertise" [metier] as her principal rivals. Manifestly, this courageous woman is even quite fearful and is the first to feel shaky in such a grueling debate. But she knows astonishingly well how to avoid all major mistakes. She unfailingly maintains a remarkable mastery over herself. She knows how to remain impeccably correct not only with respect to the president of the republic but also with respect to the two prime ministers under whose authority she served. She is able, with sobriety, to maintain such a demeanor and such broadness of view that she cannot fail to take votes away from the Gaullists: she is also going to take a lot of votes away from the socialists and indeed from the communists. Most logically, she should receive a very large number of votes, all the more so because the people of France unquestionably are going to express their pride at seeing a Frenchwoman in the forefront, with all the risks, who is of such impressive quality and whom all of Europe respects. A single concern for her: the initial public opinion polls are so much to her advantage that if she does not take care might well have a very negative [démobilisateur] effect upon voter turnout, above all if 10 June is a nice day.

George Marchais, too, is in the midst of the fray. It is only with difficulty that we discover faults in his technique and tactics. Of course, proceeding in this manner, he displays excessive audacity when, during a spectacular joint meeting with the secretary general of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico Berlinguer, he once again would force us to admit that Eurocommunism exists, that the communists of the West are no longer subject to the disciplines of a vast supranational strategy and that the Stalinists can serve a free Europe happily. At times he delightedly engages in too primitive propaganda. But he continues marvelously to play that magic instrument

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which was developed by Lenin personally: the hammering [technique]. At every opportunity, with a terrible percussive force, he indefatigably hammers out his comments about multinational companies, monopolistic gangsters, the bourgeois press, traitorous television and above all turncoat socialists. More than ever, on the small screen, he is able to interpret the class struggle with full effect. He has become master of the art of utilizing ridicule and sarcasm, all the more so because he has been amazingly spared by his opponents who are quite wrong to consider his attitudes simple clowning which in truth impact with great intensity and in depth upon the people.

Georges Marchais: A Stupefying Satanism

With absolute awareness of his full effect and with a stupefying satanism, he portrays a new "son of the people," with a stubborn brow, dark eyes, rough jaw, incisive speech, in the face of a Mitterrand who, on the contrary, has never better brought to mind the image of an intellectual poet, with tastefully refined speeches and appearance. Everything considered, it would not be surprising if on 10 June Georges Marchais obtains a percentage of votes larger than most of the prognosticators or pollsters had credited him with at the outset.

Jacques Chirac continues to be a great fighter. Few gladiators in the public arena will have outshone him in the art of wielding the gladiator's club or the net of the retiarius [gladiator armed with a trident, dagger and net]. With unquestionable talent, not only is he better able than his opponents to exalt crowds of followers but he exhibited a very studied "ferocious mildness" in an effort to place Simone Weil in difficulty during the last four-person televised debate. Thus he knows how skillfully to wield the smallest dagger equally as well as the heaviest mace. However--apart from the fact that he presents the image of a man with a jaw too ready to slash, bite and chew his words which in fact gives him a look of hardness that he does not possess--he has committed at least two serious tactical mistakes which, moreover, are almost impossible to rectify before the election. One is a mistake of substance, the other of technique. His first mistake is having set himself up as the direct opponent of the president of the republic as such. Whether Jacques Chirac wished it to be so or not, that is the most visible result of his actions over the past year. Quite obviously many men, even among those who personally respect or admire Jacques Chirac, do not admit that in this manner he is jeopardizing and endangering the authority of the president, in too critical a period, in full sarcastic view of the Marxists. Even if Jacques Chirac did not or does not wish it, the result is as if he had in this way attached the fundamental balances of the republic. The mayor of Paris would be wise to rectify such a formidable mistake before it is too late. The second mistake is inseparable from the nature of the campaign chosen by the De Gaullist general staff. It insisted upon conducting a campaign of meetings, that is, a campaign for activists. A capital mistake. For the nature of the election on the contrary makes it necessary to broaden the field of fire to

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the maximum. "The strategy of collective assemblies" [rassemblement] is to be recommended over a "strategy of exclusion" or a "strategy of intransigence," as far as the election is concerned. With the kind of law which generates masses of votes, one must rather address the greatest number of Frenchwomen and Frenchmen as calmly as possible. Meetings of activists should be avoided, meetings which tend too much to concentrate the field of fire and narrow the arguments. During his meetings, to stir up an ovation or to better excite the enthusiasm of his troops, Jacques Chirac must every evening increasingly more sharpen his attacks, intensify his accusations, darken his criticisms: at one and the same time he is losing en masse the French who do not recognize themselves in this De Gaullism which is too aggressive or too closed. He should have opted for a calm campaign, with no more than four or five big meetings. If, on 10 June, he receives a total vote count much lower than anticipated, he will owe it principally to such blunders--despite a talent for debate which continues to be brilliant.

Francois Mitterrand also does not have an ideal slate. How is it possible to leave off the slate or in a poor position such men as Michel Rocard and Alain Savary? How is it possible to relegate to the 21st position a person which the party likes to present as one of its principal thinkers? It is not surprising that the socialist campaign is getting started with a strange slowness, as if dragging heaven knows what weight of remorse or nostalgia. At times the socialists seem to be conducting the campaign as if it were a chore or forced labor. Fortunately for the first secretary, European socialism in spite of the defeat of the laborites in Great Britain continues to have prestigious influence. The very word socialism retains an exceptional power of enchantment. Francois Mitterrand himself still has total control over his talent and his argumentation. But three serious handicaps hang heavy upon the activity of our socialists. First, strangely, Francois Mitterrand unquestionably looks somewhat tired. He seems to be less incisive and less feared than during other great campaigns. He has come to the point of ignoring too many long faces of skepticism, too many stares from a tribunal which is becoming bored. We might even wonder "if he still believes in socialism." Moreover, despite his virtuosity, he now is playing a worn out record, of which the television viewer almost knows the tirades by heart and can hear all the tremolos coming. To put it bluntly, even if our words are considered too cruel, what was needed there was something new, something brand new. Next, at the national level, the socialists are losing the remarkable advantage they derived from most often having the best candidates at the local and departmental levels: in a classical election, they owe most of their victories to the fact of presenting candidates who are dynamic, respected and well-known in their sector; such will not be the case in an election of the kind we are discussing. This means, for example, that this same party whose candidates would as a whole receive a total of 28 percent of the votes in a legislative election could also receive no more than 25 or 26 percent of the votes in a national election in which the advantage of the best local candidates is of much less importance; finally, the third important handicap: This grand and magnificent party continues to wrap itself in a strategy which is no longer credible. The blows struck by

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Georges Marchais and his comrades are such that the seeking of an alliance with the communists poses for the socialists not only a problem of seriousness but also one of dignity. How can we say it better? Georges Marchais is playing the game of the well-known fable with Francois Mitterrand: "cuckolded, beaten up and happy." As for the small slates, all their votes added together should not exceed the figure of 8 percent. If this should prove otherwise, it would be an enormous surprise. Logically, among the small slates, the ones on which Arlette Laguiller and Michel de Saint-Pierre appear should receive the most votes: Is it possible to imagine that either of them can receive more than 3 percent of the votes cast? No matter what the talent of their principals may be, they are too handicapped at the audiovisual propaganda level to expect more than that.

It is also unimaginable that Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber will be able to make a breakthrough. He seems to be too confused. At least in appearances, his positions are contradictory. He is probably burdened in his campaign by the fact that, as president of the radical party, he sees important radicals appearing on almost all the other slates. Having drawn up a slate too precipitantly, in the final analysis will he even be able to muster 1 percent of the votes? Will he by in turn taking his place among the choir of the anti-Barre polemicists end up by doing harm, however little, to Simone Weil's slate, for whom it would be very easy to remind him that it was not too long ago that he asked to cross over to her side? Everything considered, will he not receive the most votes on the "opposition" slates? The only serious lesson of his actions is that the radical party is definitely doomed. The grand party, which knew so many glorious hours and seemed so long inseparable from the history of the republic, will doubtless receive the blows in this election which will put an end to it.

In the coming weeks, obviously many surprises or new developments could occur. Our prognostications could also be upset because of the fact that this is the first time a strictly proportional election at the national level has been held in France: for lack of experience, even the most astute observers of political life could be thrown off by the manner in which the country will finally determine its choices through the great masses.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

ARIANE PRODUCTION PROJECTED TO YEAR 2000

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 pp 129, 131-133, 135, 137

/Article by Pierre Langereux/

/Text/ The Ariane launch vehicle, which will make its first flight in 6 months, launched from French Guiana, was designed primarily to place in a geostationary orbit commercial satellites, primarily telecommunications and television transmission satellites. To succeed in this undertaking while staying within the scheduled time frame and costs, the project's promoters voluntarily decided to make maximum use of already known and proven technologies. Still, the design concept does contain a potential for considerable improvement, to meet the needs of both French and European space ambitions.

To handle the users' future needs (heavier and larger payloads) and to stay in line with the laws of the market, the CNES /National Center for Space Studies/, which is in charge of Ariane's development, has since 1977 been considering the evolution of European launch facilities over the coming decades, bearing in mind, of course, the existence of the U.S. Space Shuttle.

A Conventional Series

From this process of reflection came the idea of an "Ariane series," based on the present launch vehicle. This follows the example of the series of U.S. rockets: Scout, Thor Delta, and Titan, which have been successfully developed for 20 years. But unlike the United States, which is now concentrating on

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1. A circular equatorial orbit at an altitude of 36,000 km.

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a launch vehicle that will be recoverable and reusable for a decade, the Space Shuttle, the French selection was a series of "conventional rockets" (usable only once). There were three reasons for this, as the CNES explains.

1. Economically, the value of the Space Shuttle is far from being proven, even for the number of missions planned by the United States. So such a system would be even harder to justify economically for Europe.
2. The hypotheses used concerning the missions do not show a need to launch very heavy masses into low orbits. The combination of multiple payloads inside a heavy space vehicle (like the Shuttle) causes some major operational problems. Moreover, a launch vehicle capable of placing a human crew in orbit does not seem to be the best way of placing automatic satellites in orbit.
3. If human flights -- which are the main justification for the Shuttle -- were to be made using European facilities, they would probably be only an additional factor used either to provide access to international orbital stations or to improve the conditions of utilization of automatic stations (reconfigurations or repairs). This sort of mission does not require systems of the Space Shuttle type, concluded the CNES.


In order to make the initial investment economically feasible, the CNES did examine the possibilities of improving the Ariane launch vehicle independently of its missions, but with the objective of minimizing new expenditures, which would of course be spread over a period of time, and of reducing to the utmost uncertainties of a technical and scheduling nature. This was also done during the development of the Diamant family of French rockets.

Three Objectives

The plan to develop the Ariane launch vehicle is thus designed to satisfy three objectives.

1. To increase performances of the launch vehicle (its payload placed in geosynchronous orbit and in low orbits) and the volume (and diameter) of the payloads, along with the range of missions possible, even going so far as to consider human flights in a low orbit, using the Hermes manned vehicle.

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First illustration of the CNES' Hermes project, a manned hypersonic glider.

2. To decrease the total launch cost (price of the rocket and launch charges) and the specific expenses (amount of transport costs included in the cost per kg in orbit).
3. To spread out additional developments, bearing in mind the cost of modifications of the launch vehicle and the ground facilities, and the calendar deadlines imposed by the reference missions.

This plan thus calls for improving the performances of the Ariane launch vehicle out to its extreme limits during the next decade, but doing this by making successive modifications (Ariane 1 to Ariane 5), each time significantly improving the launch vehicle's performances while also preparing for the following phase. More specifically, the Ariane series is designed to encompass short term (Ariane 2 and 3) in 1982-1983, medium-term (Ariane 4) in 1984-1985, and also long-term developments (Ariane 5), for 1990.

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Ariane 2 and Ariane 3

The first phase is treated in the "Ariane Improvement Program," which was submitted to the ESA [European Space Agency] in recent months. This operation, estimated at about 360 million francs (59.1 million units of account) with a margin of 15 percent to cover possible technical problems, is in principle to be decided upon by the member states during the next Council meeting of the ESA at the end of June or the end of July. The objectives of the launcher improvement program were approved by the Ariane board of directors on 6 and 7 February 1979, and the French government, meeting in a partial cabinet session on 20 February, confirmed its intention to proceed with this program (AIR & COSMOS, no 754).

This means developing, for the end of 1982 or early 1983, two new versions of the rocket, Ariane 2 and Ariane 3; these versions could launch 1.95 ton and 2.35 tons, respectively, in an earth-synchronous transfer orbit (200-36,000 km) from the Kourou base in French Guiana. Compared with the present Ariane 1 rocket, which will place 1.7 ton in a transfer orbit, this will mean gains of 17 percent and 35 percent over the launch expenses, for an additional development cost of under 10 percent.

The savings may even be further increased by recovery of the first stage, which represents about a third (40 million francs) of the production costs of the rocket. In this case, the performances of the Ariane 2 and 3 launch vehicles (version R) would be 1.9 ton and 2.3 tons, respectively, placed in a transfer orbit.


The dual launch system, SYLDA [Double Launch System for Ariane], developed for Ariane 1, may also be adapted for the new rockets to place heavier and larger satellites in orbit; the masses of the payloads would then have to be diminished by the weight of the SYLDA. For launches into low orbits, performances of the new versions remain the same as in Ariane 1, approximately 2.5 tons in a heliosynchronous orbit at 800 km altitude, and 4.5 tons at an altitude of 200 km, with reinforced structures if necessary.

The Ariane 3 rocket will be an improved version of the present launch vehicle with more powerful engines for the three stages: the thrust of the Viking engines of the first and second stage will be increased from 9 to 10 percent by raising the pressure of the focal point of the combustion chamber (from 54 to about

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58 bars); the specific impulse of the HM7 engine of the third cryogenic stage will also be increased by raising the rate of gas expansion (80) through lengthening the nozzle divergent.



Automatic fueling tests of the "propellants model" of the rocket in its launch configuration, with the thermal protection casing surrounding the second stage (marked "Ariane").

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In addition, the mass of cryogenic propellants (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen) of the third stage will be increased from 8 tons at present (H8 stage) to 10 tons (H10 stage) by lengthening the tanks (1.25 meters) within limits compatible with the internal dimensions of the launch tower. Two boosters, each with 7.2 tons of solid propellant, will be piggy-backed to the first stage in order to provide additional thrust of about 140 tons for 28 seconds at liftoff.

Characteristics, Performances, and Costs of the Ariane Series

LANCEUR 1)	ARIANE 1	ARIANE 2	ARIANE 3	ARIANE 4	ARIANE 5
MISE EN SERVICE 2)	3) Début 1981	4) Fin 1982	5) Début 1983	1984 - 1985	1988-1990
CHARGE UTILE : 6)					
Orbite de transfert géostat. 7)	1,7 t	1,95 t	2,35 t	2,9 à 3 t	4,75 t
Orbite basse 800 km 8)	2,5 t	—	—	4 t	8 t
HAUTEUR 9)	47,4 m	48,6 m	48,6 m	51 m	50 m
MASSE au décollage 10)	208 t	210 t	227 t	275 à 295 t 15)	288 à 308 t
POUSSEE au décollage 11)	245 t	270 t	410 t	550 t	550 t
REDUCTION COUT LANCEMENT 12)	— 14)	— 17 %	— 35 %	— 63 %	15) —
COUT DE DEVELOPPEMENT 13)	4,4 milliards F	360 millions F	300 millions F	300-350 millions F	5 à 10 milliards F

Key:

1. Launch vehicle
2. Start of service
3. Early 1981
4. End of 1982
5. Early 1983
6. Payload
7. Geostationary transfer orbit
8. 800 km low orbit
9. Height
10. Mass at liftoff
11. Thrust at liftoff
12. Reduction in launch cost
13. Development cost
14. milliards = billion
15. a = to

The Ariane 2 version will have the same improvements as Ariane 3, with the exception of the two boosters which will not be included. But in both new versions, the volume of the nose cone is increased, without changing its diameter (3.2 meters) by lengthening the cylindrical part (+0.66 m) and by a modification of the forward part of the cone. This would increase the total length of the nose cone to 8.65 meters.

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Ariane 4


The medium-term phase, 1984-1985, calls for the development, in principle by European cooperation, of an Ariane 4 version, which would be added to the Ariane 2 and Ariane 3 versions, whose production would continue. Ariane 4 is a significant improvement over the Ariane 3 version and an intermediate phase toward the most powerful launch vehicle of the series, Ariane 5. Its performance in an earth-synchronous transfer orbit, which remains the principal mission, should reach 2.9 to 3.0 tons with a launch cost 63 percent less than that of the present launch vehicle. This rocket could be used to launch at the same time a heavy satellite (direct television transmission) and a medium-class satellite (telecommunications) through a new adaptation of the SYLDA. In low orbits, if some of the structures were reinforced, its performance could reach 4 tons in a circular heliosynchronous orbit at an altitude of 800 km, and 7 tons in a circular equatorial orbit at an altitude of 400 km.

The improvements introduced in the Ariane 4 affect essentially the first stage, whose mass of storable propellants (UDMH and N_2O_4) would be increased from 145 tons (L145 stage), as in the first three versions, to 180 or 200 tons (L180 or L200 stages) by lengthening the tanks (about 2.8 meters). The thrust and specific impulse of the second stage Viking 4 engine would also be improved and four boosters of 7.2 tons of solid propellant each would be attached to the first stage to increase the thrust at liftoff. If the users express such a need (and its feasibility is demonstrated), the diameter of the nose cone would be increased from 3.2 m to 3.6 or 3.8 meters.

A Second Launch Pad

But if this is done, the rocket will be so long that Ariane 4 will no longer be compatible with the existing launch tower. According to the CNES, the adaptation of the present launch site necessarily entails the preliminary construction of a second launch area in order to avoid interrupting the launch program for over a year. The construction of this second launch area -- which would share equipment with the present launch pad -- would also increase the launch facilities' availability. It would be possible to optimize the pace of the launches (with at least five shots a year) and it would also offer some protection against accidental damage of the launch area, which would seriously disrupt the launch schedule. The construction of this second launch pad is planned for 1984-1985. The cost of development of the Ariane 4 and a second launch area would be approximately 300 to 350 million francs.

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Key:

1. Nose cone + SYLDA
2. Guidance and control section
3. Third stage
4. Second stage (L34)
5. First stage (L145)
6. 1980: Ariane 1: 1700 kg in transfer orbit
7. Compatible with present launch site
8. Lengthened nose cone
9. SYLDA adaptation
10. Lengthened fuel tank
11. HM7 "flange"
12. Viking 4 thrust increase
13. First stage recovery kit
14. Feasibility to be demonstrated
15. Addition of two P7 boosters (Ariane 3)
16. Viking 5 thrust increase
17. Incompatible with present launch site
18. Nose cone increased
19. Reinforcement of guidance and control structures and third stage
20. Viking 4 thrust and specific impulse increase
21. Lengthened fuel tanks
22. Transition to four boosters (P7)
23. 1982/1983: Ariane 2: \approx 2,000 kg; Ariane 3: \approx 2,350 kg in transfer orbit
24. Second launch site
25. 1984/1985: Ariane 4: 2,900 to 3,000 kg in transfer orbit
26. New segmentable nose cone
27. Multiple launch system
28. New guidance and control section
29. H40/45 cryogenic stage
30. New cryogenic engine
31. First stage "reliabilization"
32. Transition to four P8.5 boosters
33. Increased empennage structures
34. Ariane 5/2: \approx 9,500 kg in low 200 km orbit
35. Ariane 5/3A: \approx 4,700 kg in transfer orbit
36. Third stage under nose cone derived from H8
37. Storable propellants stages
38. 1988/1990: Ariane 5:
39. Ariane 5/4: \approx 2,500 kg in geostationary orbit > 200 kg outside of solar system
40. Ariane 5/3B: > 7000 kg in 800 km orbit
41. Hermes manned vehicle
42. Ariane 5H: manned flight in low orbit

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Nose cone of Ariane launch vehicle manufactured in Switzerland by Contraves AG.

Ariane 5, a Multipurpose Launch Vehicle

In the long term, beyond Ariane 4, a significant development of performances can not be made without a major change in the launch vehicle's configuration. The CNES also states that: "An examination of the users' needs towards the 1990s shows a growing interest in low and medium orbits (up to 1,000 km) for observation of the earth, development of materials, etc., but also for the assembly of large structures and modular manned stations, or stations that would be simply visitable (for bringing supplies, maintenance, modifications, etc.)"

For this reason, the CNES has proposed for the 1988-1990 period the development of a multipurpose launch vehicle, Ariane 5, which could be used in at least five different configurations,

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depending on the mission. Generally speaking, the Ariane 5 launch vehicle is derived from the Ariane 4 version by a complete change of the upper part. The two upper stages used until then would be replaced by a single second stage with a large diameter (4.6 m instead of 2.6 m) with 40 to 45 tons of cryogenic propellants (H₂O or H₂ stage) and a new liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen engine providing 60 to 80 tons of thrust (HM60 engine). The work in preparation for the development of this version should be undertaken now so that the launcher may be operational at the end of the next decade.

The first stage of the Ariane 5 now proposed would be the same as that of Ariane 4, but this stage seems to be somewhat lacking in power for this new rocket, so it might also be enlarged (to the same diameter as the rest of the rocket). In any event, it will require some redesign in order to upgrade its reliability to a level compatible with the presence of a human crew. The guidance and control system would also be improved for the same reason. Moreover, the four Ariane 5 boosters would be larger than the ones used in the preceding version (at least 8.5 tons of solid propellant instead of 7.2 tons). In all, the Ariane 5 rocket would weigh 308 tons at liftoff (with a height of 50 meters) and it would develop a thrust of 550 tons.

The Ariane 5 rocket will have a new nose cone with the same diameter (4.6 m) and a usable volume half that (170 cubic meters) of the U.S. Shuttle, which will enable it to launch very large payloads: 9.5 to 10 tons in a low circular orbit at an altitude of 200 km, with a 30° inclination. A new payload adapter will also make it possible to make multiple launches and to provide some of the same services offered by the Space Shuttle. This two-stage with nose cone configuration, optimized for launches in low orbits, is designated Ariane 5/2.


Depending on its mission, Ariane 5 may also be equipped with an "additional propulsion system" placed under the nose cone. This will consist of either:

1. A new cryogenic third stage, derived from the present third stage (with the same HM7 engine with 7 tons of thrust), to optimize the launch of heavy payloads (4.75 tons) in an earth-synchronous transfer orbit, still with the possibility of a double launch. This is the Ariane 5/3A configuration.

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2. A new third stage with storable propellants equipped with the propulsion system of the Hermes vehicle for launches to medium orbits (for example, 7 tons in a heliosynchronous circular orbit at an altitude of 800 km). This is the Ariane 5/3B configuration.
3. Or a combination of the two complementary stages under a nose cone (cryogenic third stage and a fourth stage with storable propellants) for a four-stage rocket. This is the Ariane 5/4 configuration to be used for earthsynchronous launches and for sending planetary probes (2.5 tons toward Venus or 600 kg toward Jupiter) or beyond the solar system (200 kg), possibly to remove radioactive nuclear wastes, such as actinides!



Aerial view of the Ariane launch complex at Kourou with the propellants model of the rocket erected on the launch pad.

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Ariane 5/H and Hermes

The Ariane 5/H version of the rocket will be used to launch the manned vehicle, Hermes, into a low circular orbit at an altitude of 200 km, with a 30° or less inclination, in order to assemble and service orbital stations (see AIR & COSMOS, no 767, pages 66-67).

Hermes is a hypersonic delta-wing glider project with a total mass of 10 tons, or two times larger than an Apollo capsule and even larger than a Soyuz vessel. It could carry at most five astronauts or only two passengers and 1.5 ton of freight, and it could remain in orbit for a week. It would be launched from Kourou by the Ariane 5/H rocket (without a nose cone) and recovered, like the Shuttle, on a landing strip where the glider will touch down. The guidance and control of this aerospace vehicle will be entirely automated. It will be reusable for a certain number of missions.

These projects -- the Ariane 5 multipurpose launch vehicle and Hermes, the manned hypersonic glider -- are still in the phase of preliminary studies. The CNES believes it will be ready to present more detailed proposals to its European partners in about a year and a half after an in-depth study. The feasibility of some important technological points still remains to be determined, particularly for the development of the Hermes hypersonic glider. The most critical points are the reusable thermal protection and the electric power supply by fuel cells.

Also to be determined is the cost of these development, which would be spread over 7 to 8 years. The development of Ariane 5 could be estimated from 5 to 10 billion francs (depending on which first stage is used). The cost of development of the Hermes project is estimated at about 10 billion francs.

Six Months Before the First Ariane Launch

Now when the real scale model of the European rocket Ariane is being displayed in public for the first time at the Le Bourget 79 Salon, we are just 6 months away from the first flight test shot of the new launch vehicle. This first launch was set for 3 November 1979; it is still scheduled for November, but a few days later.

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At the present time, the integration of this first rocket is being completed at the SIL /Launcher Integration Site/ at Les Mureaux. Aerospatiale, the industrial architect for the launch vehicle, along with the other main contractors (SEP /European Propellant Company/, MATRA, etc.) is making the final overall checkout of the rocket; this will be completed in mid-June.

Before sending the rocket to Guiana, the CNES and the industries involved must still carry out two important procedures: putting down the third stage in order to integrate the last modifications tested by bench testing, and a checkout of the turbopump bearings of the Viking engine of the first and second stages (after finding a defect in the lubrication of the bearings during the bench testing).

The first Ariane rocket (LO1) will leave for Guiana only at the end of August, slightly later than originally planned. The launch test program will begin during the first week of September; it will last 2 and a half months.


Several inspections of its flight aptitude will be made before the launch, one during the last week in June and the other in September, primarily to incorporate the results of the second qualification shot of the first stage (planned in August) and of the shots of the third stage propulsion system, which will resume in June (the first qualification shot of the third stage propulsion system is scheduled for mid-November 1979, after the LO1 shot). A third qualification shot for the second stage is scheduled in September, but in principle, this stage is already qualified.

SYLDA, the Double Launch System for Ariane

Ariane's SYLDA system is designed to enable the European rocket in its present version and in future versions to launch two satellites at the same time. These would be satellites of the Thor Delta class (800 to 1,020 kg each). The SYLDA is shaped like an egg-cup which is separated in two parts along a horizontal plane. One of the satellites is placed inside the container and the other is on top, outside (but still inside the launch vehicle's nose cone). The upper satellite is released first, then the upper half-shell of the SYLDA is ejected to release the inside satellite, which is then released in turn.

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The SYLDA is being developed under a contract (19 million francs) from the European Space Agency by Aerospatiale (France) with the participation of SAAB-Scania (Sweden) for the three separation subsystems. It weighs 165 kg, but it does replace the adaptor (44 kg) to be used for single launches. This means it represents an additional mass of only 120 kg for the launch vehicle. The SYLDA's structure is a sandwich of high modulus carbon fibers mounted on a honeycomb web. In the original design, the unit measures 4 meters in height and 2.8 meters in diameter. A longer version (+0.5 m) is planned for launching satellites of the STS/PAM class.

The SYLDA is now scheduled to be used for the first time in April 1981 to place in a geostationary orbit the European satellite Sirio 2 along with the maritime telecommunications satellite, MARECS B, of the ESA.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

LARGE ARIANE SATELLITE MARKET PROJECTED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 pp 139, 141

[Article by Pierre Langeroux: "The 'Ariane' Satellites: A Market of 6 to 11 billion F"]

[Text] "Average" all-inclusive prices (with insurance) for operational launchings towards the end of 1982 and the beginning of 1983 of rockets of the second lot in the series are as follows (mid-1978 price):

- Launchings into geostationary orbit of the "Ariane" class satellites (full capacity):

- . 175 million F, European price.
- . 140 million, exportation price.
- Launchings of "Delta" class satellites:
 - . 95 million F, European price, double firing.
 - . 75 million F, exportation price, double firing.
 - . 150 million F, European price, single firing.

The first four trial flight launchings of the European "Ariane" rocket--firings LO1-LO4, scheduled for 1979 and 1980--will put five European and foreign satellites into orbit, as well as the four "Ariane" technological capsules (CAT).

The first rocket (LO1), which will be launched in November 1979 from Kourou, French Guinea, will be equipped with only a 150 kg "CAT" capsule and ballast. The total load thus thrust into a 200-36,000 km geosynchronous transference orbit, inclined at 17.5°, will be 1,600 kg.

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The second rocket (LO2), to be launched in March 1980, will put three satellites into the same geosynchronous transference orbit: the 150 kg "CAT"; the amateur-radio satellite, the "AMSAT-Oscar 9" (2 kg); and the German scientific satellite, the "Firewheel" (1,080 kg). The two latter satellites will be equipped with a perigee engine which will make it possible to put them on their definitive orbits. "Oscar 9" will revolve on an orbit of 900 to 1,500 km perigee and an apogee of 35,000 km, while the "Firewheel" will be on an orbit of 227-54,500 km.

The third rocket (LO3), which will be launched in June 1980, will also put three satellites into a 900-36,000 km transference orbit, inclined at 10.5°: a "CAT," with ballast (315 kg); India's telecommunications satellite, "Apple" (630 kg); and the European meteorological satellite, "Meteosat 2" (670 kg). The latter two satellites will be equipped with an apogee engine. They will be the first geostationary satellites launched by "Ariane."

The fourth rocket (LO4), scheduled to be launched in October 1980, will put the following into a 200-36,000 km transference orbit, inclined at 8°: a "CAT" capsule and the European maritime telecommunications satellite, "MARECS A" (960 kg, including 444 kg for the "Mare 1 S" apogee engine), which will then be placed on a geostationary orbit. During the flight, this satellite will be equipped with an "Ariane" (DIVA) device to eliminate vibrations.

Construction and launching costs of these four test rockets and for the manufacture of the "CAT" capsules (utilized during only six revolutions) are part of the developmental program of the "Ariane" launcher.

A first lot of a series of six rockets is already in construction. One lot of five rockets was ordered in December 1978, to which another launcher was added in April 1979 for the Intelsat organization, which gave a confirmed order, and one on option, for a rocket to ESA.

One of these six rockets is a reserve one for a possible launching; the other five are scheduled to put six satellites--two of them as double firings--into orbit in 1981 and 1982. They are the European scientific telecommunications satellite, "MARECS-B" (Intelsat), and "Telecom 1A" (France), the latter in place of the French reconnaissance satellite, "Spot," scheduled to be launched later (March 1984).

A second lot of five rockets, "Ariane" series (one in reserve), is to be ordered in January 1980, in order to launch the European communications satellites, "MARECS C" (to be decided) and "ECS 2" (decided in December 1978).

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by the ESA with "ECS 3" and "4"), as well as other satellites in planning for Europe or for foreign countries.

The first "Ariane" operational launchings, which will take place on orbits of 185-36,000 km geosynchronous transference, inclined at 8.75° or 9.5°, are presently scheduled for the following dates:

- April 1981 (L5) for the "Sirio 2" and "MARECS B" satellites, with the first utilization of the double launching system, "SYLDA."
- July 1981 (L6) for the "Intelsat 5" satellite.
- November 1981 (L7) for the Exosat" satellite.
- February 1982 (L8) for the "ECS 1" satellite.

These launchings of confirmed projects are scheduled in principle for firm dates. The launching of the "Intelsat 5" satellite may be advanced to April 1981, at the request of Intelsat. But the CNES [National Center for Space Studies] has estimated that the first "Ariane" operational firing may be made in February 1981 (instead of April).

The following operational launchings have been scheduled for the usual firing crenels of the Kourou firing range:

- April 1982 (L9) for the "MARECS C" satellite.
- June 1982 (L10) for another "Intelsat 5" satellite.
- October 1982 (L11) for the "ECS 2" satellite and another as yet undetermined satellite. This will be the first flight of the new "Ariane 3" rocket.
- December 1982 (L12) for the French satellite, "Telecom 1 A."

In 10 years, from 1981 to 1990, the "Ariane" rocket could launch from 27 to 45 satellites, according to speculations (pessimistic or optimistic) on a world market of 220 satellites. The average European launcher market is about 36 launchings, 6 in 1981-1982 and 30 during the 1983 to 1990 period. These satellites include about 10 satellites of the 500 kg class and about 20 of the 900 kg class. In this regard one notes the importance of the heavy satellites for direct TV, which would probably utilize a platform that would be adapted to "Ariane," and this, from 1973 on. Well, the realization of this "Ariane" platform has not yet been settled in Europe. It is the only element lacking in the "Ariane" panoply, but it is now the

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most critical. But the CNES hopes that a positive decision will be made soon concerning the plan for a French direct TV satellite--possibly to be developed in cooperation with Germany--which will make it possible then to have a heavy platform. For its part, the ESA has prepared a new plan for a direct TV satellite, named "L-SAT," which will be introduced at the beginning of July to the member states. This plan is also designed for a new European heavy platform for "Ariane."

All together, the "Ariane" promoters hope to capture 14 to 23 percent of the world commercial satellite market during the next 10 years, which would represent a market of 6-11 billion francs!

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

TACTICAL AIR FORCE JAGUARS EVALUATED

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 21 Apr 79 pp 23-25, 27

[Article by Jean de Galard: "The Jaguars in the Tactical Air Force"]

[Text] The following article was written on the basis of an interview which air corps General Michel Forget, appointed commander of the Tactical Air Force in the First Air Region as of 24 February 1979, was kind enough to grant us.

In the 27 months preceding his appointment to head this large command, General Forget served as second in command of the Tactical Air Force for the First Air Region. In other words he is very familiar with the Tactical Air Force. He also knows the Jaguars and their functional characteristics, because in the course of the past two years, among other duties, he has been responsible, outside the hexagon and at the request of the countries to which France is linked by defense and cooperation agreements, to see to the use of this tactical support aircraft.

General Forget is equally familiar with air defense, because he served in turn as commander of the north air defense zone and commander of the east air defense zone, serving for 13 months between these two posts as head of the military staff of the minister of defense.

General Forget, who has logged more than 6,000 hours of flight time to date, was particularly well qualified to draft what we would call an assessment of the Jaguar in operation, for the information of our readers 18 months following the publication of our issue number 690 ("The Jaguar in Service in Seven Tactical Air Force Squadrons"). He explains among other things why this assessment can be judged very satisfactory on all points.

120 Jaguars in Service

Placed with eight units (three with the Seventh Squadron, based in Saint-Dizier, one with the Third Squadron, based in Nancy, and four with the 11th Squadron, based in Toul, although the fourth unit within it, established on 1 January 1979, is based in Bordeaux), 121 Jaguars will be

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in use by 30 June 1979. Of these 114 were already in service as of 15 April, a week ago, having logged 90,000 hours of flight time. At the present rate of unit activity, it is probable that the 100,000-flight-hour mark will be passed this coming summer, i.e. less than two years after the 50,000-hour mark was passed (see AIR ET COSMOS, No 690, p 21).

In the course of the past 18 months, General Forget explained, four major developments have characterized the activity of the Jaguars within the Tactical Air Force.

1. The commissioning of the Ardennes 3/3 unit on the operational level in the spring of 1978, where the execution of its main mission was concerned: attack force support using the Martel AS-37 anti-radar missile. In fact since May 1978, as had been planned, the 18 pilots in this unit with 15 Jaguars, including a model E two-seater, are able to carry out, on the same basis as the pilots of the two other units in the Third Squadron, equipped for their part with Mirage IIIE aircraft, both this main mission and the secondary one, which may range from low-altitude cover to classic attack.
2. The establishment of the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux: although the unit was officially established last January, the preparations necessary for its creation occupied the whole of the year 1978 in fact, in the course of which the two training formation was responsible for providing ground instruction for all of the mechanics and some of the pilots in the unit. All of this preparatory and installation activity culminated during the last quarter of the year. At present, the commander of the Tactical Air Force explained, the 4/11 has 12 pilots for 8 planes, and will in turn be entirely operational, with 18 pilots for 15 planes, this coming 30 June, after which date it can fully carry out its main mission, which will be, as is the case for units 1 and 3 of the 11th Squadron, conventional attack and overseas action.

When questioned about the possible undesirability for the Tactical Air Force command of the geographic distance of this squadron from the other units in the command, General Forget said that the distance poses no problem, on the contrary fully illustrating the major trump provided the command by its great mobility, which is essential since it must be capable of action where a threat occurs, and that it represents the expression in any case of a general military policy designed to ensure greater flexibility for action to clear any area toward the southeast and the southwest of the hexagon. In practice, as would be the case with a classic redeployment operation, the Tactical Air Force relies solely on the Fourth Unit on the operational level, with the Third Air Region providing all the support necessary in this connection.

All in all, the situation of the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux is comparable to that of a Strategic Air Force unit at a base where units of other major commands are located. At the most, the result for the commander of the 11th Squadron might be the "inconvenience" of having to make some shifts from Toul to Bordeaux in order to better control and follow up the training

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The Jaguar, General Forget commented, is precisely the plane required to provide the kind of demonstrations which were requested last year and those of a peaceful nature provided on an average of twice a year by the Jaguars of the tactical air command at the request of friendly countries. This was the case in February 1978 during a mission to the Ivory Coast and also in December, with an operation carried out in Togo (Mangrove exercise) jointly with the Togolese air force.

The foreign missions carried out in 1977 and 1978 revealed the speed with which the Jaguars can reach the sites where their action was required, as well as their functional efficiency. The plane's navigation system also received high marks. Currently the Tactical Air Force is maintaining two small detachments with all their Jaguar equipment in Africa.

Results in Exercises and Maneuvers

The various missions carried out last year outside French territory by the Jaguars of the Tactical Air Force in no way hindered the development of the planned annual maneuvers, whether target practice carried out in Cazaux or more specific maneuvers of the Coupe Centaure type in which, in addition to the Jaguars, the Mirage IIIE aircraft of other tactical nuclear squadrons in the Tactical Air Force also participated.

Where the results obtained in the course of air-to-air target practice were concerned, General Forget termed them remarkable, and noted with satisfaction that the Jaguar pilots achieved good results very speedily on an average in the course of these practice sessions. Each unit has 15 days a year for air-to-air target practice in Cazaux, and unit 3/11, for example, is there now.

During the test in the Coupe Centaure, which was carried out in September of 1978 as a competition between two nuclear squadrons of Mirage IIIE aircraft from the Luxeuil base and two nuclear squadrons of Jaguars from the base in Saint-Dizier, two pilots in the 1/7 unit placed second and fourth, respectively, in the individual ranking. The Coupe Centaure made clear the advantage the radar equipment on board provides to the pilots of the Mirage IIIEs, and for the Jaguar pilots, the precision of the navigation systems with which the planes are equipped, not to mention their greater flight range.

The Tactical Air Force Jaguars also participated actively, both in 1978 and 1979, in the Datex maneuvers, and next week they will participate in Exentia 79 (see page 32 in this connection). A detachment of 12 Jaguars from the 2/11 unit will be temporarily based in Saint-Nazaire, and 8 from the Seventh Squadron and unit 3/3 will be deployed in Cazaux.

180 Hours of Flight and Special Assignments

General Forget made a point of stressing that despite the missions to which the Jaguar pilots of the 11th Squadron were assigned outside the hexagon last

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year, the requirement of 180 flight hours per pilot per year was met, with an equitable distribution of flight hours among all the units. What is at least as important to the operational ability of combat plane pilots, he believes, is that this flight be regular. This requires good planning and a new effort.

The specialization of the Tactical Air Force units is being maintained. Let us recall that where the Jaguar squadrons are concerned, it is as follows: units 1/7 and 3/7 have nuclear penetration as their principal mission, and as their secondary mission, classic assault; the principal mission of unit 2/7 is the training of Jaguar pilots and periodic checking of their instruction, while its secondary mission is tactical support in classical weaponry; unit 3/3 has as its principal mission attack assistance (using the AS-37 missile), as is the case for unit 2/11, which is especially equipped for electronic warfare (offensive jamming equipment), and the secondary mission of these two units is tactical support; the principal mission of units 1/11, 3/11 and 4/11 is classical tactical support, but where units 3/11 and more recently 4/11 are concerned, their use for overseas operation is a certainty.

The specific assignment of unit 2/11 is offensive electronic warfare with the main goal of scrambling and neutralizing enemy defense equipment. The specific apparatus planned requires a great deal of electrical energy for use and is generally bulky. Within a period of three years, unit 2/11 will be very active in this sector. For the time being, it is pursuing various experiments jointly with the CEAM [Military Air-Experimentation Center]. At a later date it will have the task of training all of the Tactical Air Force pilots and mechanics, and its duties will include establishing the rules covering the conditions for the use and functioning of this specific apparatus.

Attrition and Improvement

The commander of the Tactical Air Force described the attrition rate for the Jaguars in the first five years of their commissioning for service, between 1973 and 1977, as low. The year 1978, on the other hand, was a bad year, in terms of the number of planes lost, but General Forget hastened to correct this impression. On the one hand, he remains persuaded that since the plane is a good one and both pilots and mechanics are highly motivated where flight safety is concerned, the attrition rate for the Jaguars will quickly return to what it was in 1975 and 1976--very low. On the other hand, he stressed that four out of five of the accidents which occurred outside of France last year could equally well have occurred in metropolitan France, and were not in any case due to the impact of military attack.

Quite the contrary, the Jaguar is perfectly equipped to defend itself despite the multiplicity and diversity of the enemy ground-air system. On the one hand it has the triple advantage of its weaponry (air-to-air and

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status of these pilots. It goes without saying that the structure of the air force is such that it can easily effect such deployment action.

3. The capacity provided the Jaguar for reconnaissance, which has proved very beneficial. General Forget explained in this connection that reconnaissance is a permanent assignment for every combat pilot. "One must go and see." To this end, the majority of the Jaguar A single-seat models for units 1 and 3 of the 11th Squadron were equipped with Omera 40 panoramic cameras last year. The aircraft of unit 4/11 are also awaiting installation of this equipment. Present plans do not call for equipping other units than these three in the 11th Squadron with the capacity for reconnaissance, by way of an auxiliary secondary mission, which proved particularly valuable during the activities carried out in 1978 outside the hexagon. The use of this photographic equipment requires rather general training for pilots which is provided for them by the 33rd Reconnaissance Squadron in Strasbourg. Naturally, this capacity serves to supplement that of the Mirage IIIR and IIIRD aircraft of the 33rd Squadron, for which reconnaissance is the main mission.

4. The sum of the experience acquired in connection with the military activities carried out at the request of client countries. In this connection, the Jaguar has indeed given proof of its operational capacity, and the pilots have demonstrated all of the benefits they can extract from the excellent aircraft available to them.

About 100 Percent Performance

The commander of the Tactical Air Force summarized the comments which could be made about the functioning of the Jaguars during missions outside the hexagon for which they were used last year in a few meaningful statements. These missions made it possible to test the reliability of the fueling in-flight system and the weapons system, as well as the quality of the weaponry, particularly in the case of the missions involving target practice.

The overall performance of the Jaguars in this connection was near 100 percent, which is remarkable. The majority of the planes employed, after refueling in-flight, carried out missions involving targets located sometimes more than 1,500 kilometers from their point of departure.

The fact that the plane has twin engines won praise. The engines functioned very well on this occasion, despite trying weather conditions, in terms of heat. The refueling in-flight operations, in the course of which the use of the modulated PC proved especially useful and effective and provided satisfaction beyond expectations, became routine operations or at least regular activities for the pilots of the 11th Squadron last year.

Today, more than half the Jaguar pilots are trained to carry out missions involving one or several refuelings in-flight.

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air-to-ground), its speed (it can carry 3.8 tons of weaponry at 500 knots flying low, while the B-17 fortress used in 1943-1944 could not carry as much at 10,000 feet), and its maneuverability, and, since its career is just beginning, it is subject to constant improvement. Some have to do with pilot aids, and others with weaponry (see the articles on pages 29 and 31 in this connection). General Forget, for his part, noted the two areas in which weaponry efforts will be focused: on the one hand the low-altitude release of fragmentation bombs, and on the other very high-precision firing, making possible the destruction of heavily defended specific targets following evasive action to escape enemy anti-aircraft defense efforts.


Meanwhile, the mounting of a laser range-finder, beginning with Jaguar number 81, has greatly facilitated the task of the pilot in firing passes, since the assessment of distances is always difficult, except at firing ranges where there are generally very useful visual reference points.

In the repair and maintenance sector, it is still too soon to assess how the equipment ages, because the "oldest" air force Jaguars have only just exceeded 1,200 flight hours. The modular concept of the engine, in any case, has yielded happy results on the levels of economy (fewer replacement flywheels and less industrial work) and performance.

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Under this photo of the Jaguar No 117, one of the last taken by the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux, the aperture of the telemetric laser can be seen.



The mounting of a panorama camera Omera 40 in the nose of the fuselage of a Jaguar A of the 4/11 unit in Bordeaux.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

ARMORED MILITARY MANEUVERS--In October [1979], President Giscard will officiate at the most extensive armored unit maneuvers to take place [in France] since World War II. The maneuvers will be held in the Saone and Doubs Departments. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 22 Jun 79 p 51]

CORSICAN AUTONOMISTS WORRYING--The police have become aware of an increasing nervousness among the autonomists on Corsica as the "trial of the 21" proceeds in the National Security Court. There is fear that the Corsican extremists may imitate the methods of the Italian leftists who maim their victims by firing bullets into their legs. (Text) [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Jun 79 p 17]

BASQUE AUTONOMISTS ANGERED--The Basque autonomists have written to VALEURS ACTUELLES to reproach it for having revealed (on 21 May) their intention to kidnap Jacques Chaban-Delmas. For that reason, they have been forced to "put off the operation and rethink their plans for action." Group RP 259 (the French section of the revolutionary organization Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna, or ETA) has announced: "We can now tell you that this action will take place before the end of the year and as a result great progress will be made on the path to freeing the Basque people." [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 25 Jun 79 p 17]

PCF REDEFINES RESPONSIBILITIES--The new responsibilities of the PCF secretariat are to be redefined by the central committee on 21 June. Pierre Juquin will probably become PCF spokesman and put in charge of the [PCF] weekly FRANCE NOUVELLE. Jean-Francois Gau, one of Georges Marchais' secretaries, will probably fill editorialist Francette Lazard's job with L'HUMANITE; she is said to be going to work with Guy Hermier dealing with "intellectual" matters. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 18 Jun 79 p 45]

STATUS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE--The author reviews the possibility of the use of biological arms. After analysing the different pathogenic agents and more specifically military problems posed by the use of such arms, the role of military health services is envisaged at various levels: alert, detection, immediate protection, identification, prophylaxis and treatment. The principles of medical defence against biological attack are identical to those used in the treatment of natural infection. Finally, the author emphasises the real threat represented by biological arms, forbidden by international conventions and whose effects are difficult to predict. [Text] [Paris MEDECINE ET ARMEES in English Vol 7 No 4 1979 p 348]

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

STAMMATI INTERVIEWED ON FOREIGN TRADE

Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 8 Jun 79 p 9

[Interview with Senator and former Minister of Treasury Stammati]

[Text] [Question] Senator Stammati, the brief interval of "national solidarity" has produced some positive economic results, though within a political framework that has been breaking up gradually. Do you feel that these results have contributed substantially to a change in the international market's assessment of the Italian "market-place?" In other words, has the flow of investments and--more generally speaking--international trade reflected, positively and tangibly, a mitigation of the "Italy risk?"

[Answer] Regarding the question of the "Italy risk," I have personal recollections of very difficult times back in the period when I was minister of treasury in Andreotti's third government. The 12 months between October 1976 and October 1977 represent to some extent the synthesis, in a manner of speaking the "pulse," of the change in international opinion about us. I am taking the liberty of this brief step backwards in time in order to explain that the "Italy risk," a phenomenon whose scope was clearly perceptible in October 1976 at the International Monetary Fund meeting in Manila, was already considerably at an end 1 year later at the meeting in Washington.

That it was a forgotten matter was demonstrated by the American bankers who in large numbers sought me out on that occasion to negotiate loans for our country. That was a political time of great importance for our economy because the solidarity of the various forces that supported the Andreotti government by their abstention permitted an incisive and unambiguous action that constituted the basis of the renewal process we are now experiencing.

[Question] One of the major criticisms leveled against the government by the sectors of production has been the lack of a basic "political" support for the penetration of foreign markets. Fortunately, this governmental attitude has been rectified by the activity of former Minister [of Foreign Trade] Ossola, and in these past few weeks by the activity that you have initiated. But a certain governmental passiveness remains. In your opinion, has enough been done? Do the difficulties of international trade require an intensification of the efforts being made, and perhaps new initiatives?

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[Answer] It is essentially true that the so-called "Italian economic miracle" has resulted more from a spontaneous "germination" than from coordinated action. The results were noted during the economic and energy crises from 1973 on. Yet it is also true that in recent years, that is, within the framework of the policy of "national solidarity," say from 1976 on, much has been done to give a common impulse--I would say a cooperative impulse--to Italian penetration of foreign markets.

[Question] Minister Stammati, do you believe our foreign policy should be somewhat modified, particularly with regard to relations with the countries of the so-called merging areas: the socialist, OPEC and Third World countries?

[Answer] Relations with the so-called emerging nations should be intensified; this is a traditional part of our economic policy, and, as I said, should be intensified, especially in terms of the spectacular improvement of our foreign trade balance.

The Italian economy is one of transformation that bases its possibilities for expansion, and therefore its survival, on the existing differences between the imported raw and semiraw product and the finished export product.

The greater the value added, the higher the profit of our enterprises and the greater their ability to reinvest and create new employment.

Therefore, the goal of our process of industrial reconversion is to expand the areas of production with high added value in relation to the influx of imported products.

Thus, with regard to the countries producing raw materials, there is the dual need to be able to depend on secure supplies from them and at the same time to increase the flow of exports of goods and services as to generate an availability of foreign currency to offset the increasing burdens that oil imports impose on the balance of trade.

A separate point can be made for the Third World. Here we are concerned with countries whose growing industrialization can count on extremely low labor costs, with their products consequently being highly competitive. In order for the Italian presence to penetrate and increase in those markets, it is therefore necessary to aim at quality products and at the rationalization of production processes with investments for expansion in the advanced sectors. Unfortunately, the domestic economic crisis has reduced such investments.

[Question] Minister Stammati, in your opinion, do the new serious problems presented by the oil crisis require substantial changes in the relations of trade and cooperation with the [other] producing nations?

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[Answer] As I said before, dependence on a single energy source creates the dual need for security of supply and for covering the burdens deriving from that dependence. What it involves is a strategic course of action to be followed on the basis of a series of bilateral agreements entailing the exchange of oil for our goods and services. It is a course of action that involves the overall policy of the government, and as such cannot be implemented by the minister of foreign trade alone.

On the other hand, it can be implemented within an international context that is more adjustable and stable; to implement it, it is necessary to be careful to avoid a future repetition of kinds of the times caused by the Yom Kippur War and by the Iranian institutional crisis.

[Question] Senator Stamatì, in recent months Italian exports have seen particularly good times. However, the international indicators give reason to fear a slowdown in international demand in the near future. Do you think that the "magical moment" of our exports is about to pass?

[Answer] We are faced with a certain resumption of the inflationary trend, and the future situation presents some uncertainty because of the considerable increase in the cost of oil and other raw materials, the effects of which are still not clear. Our economy is one that is being drawn along rather than doing the leading, and as such it is bound and conditioned by the capacity for development of the system of which it forms a part.

However, the preceding statements are somewhat positive, because even if a certain slowdown in the growth of the American economy is expected in the second half of this year, the pace of foreign demand in Europe appears to be favorable. However, the danger of inflationary tensions still remains, due to the rise in the price of raw materials.

Such a possibility would have a negative effect on the growth of the GNP of the European countries, which this year is expected to be 3.6 percent, compared to 2.8 percent in 1978. But it must still be said that even though the Italian economy is influenced by positive indications, it continues to be characterized by serious structural deficiencies that must be overcome by means of a policy of qualifying public expenditure and of increased investment.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

DIRECTOR OF ENERGY SOURCES INTERVIEWED ON OIL SUPPLY

Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 8 Jun 79 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Energy Sources Director Giuseppe Ammassari by Claudio Alo:
"Government and Companies in Italy Vying for 'Foreign' Refinery Products"]

[Text] Rome. The arm wrestling is on. The stakes are an adequate level of petroleum supplies for Italy, a result, to tell the truth, which the two contenders say they want to attain. On one side of the table we have the petroleum companies which for some time have been protesting against the inadequacies of the Italian price-fixing system and which resent the decision, adopted on 28 May by the Ministry of Industry, to block in Italy 35 percent of the products derived from the processing of the crude of foreign clients in Italian refineries.

"This is a decision," say the private petroleum companies quite harshly, "which is useless, damaging, and contrary to the national interest."

On the other side of the table, with equal determination, we have a government in general or, more specifically, the Ministry of Industry and, further down, Giuseppe Ammassari, the Director General of Energy Sources, who responds to the arguments of the petroleum companies. According to statistics available to the Ministry--Ammassari maintains in fact--the oil companies enormously stepped up their processing for foreign orders, instead reducing final processing here. They therefore do not have any confidence in the official commitments undertaken with regard to supplies for Italy while products are beginning to become scarce.

A new round began yesterday in this long arm wrestling contest which has now been going on for several months. Ammassari as a matter of fact summoned the representatives of the petroleum companies, both public and private, which operate in Italy, to the Ministry. The meeting topic was this: On the one hand, a check on the status of supply program implementation and, on the other hand, the famous provision of 28 May which caused very stiff protests from the petroleum companies.

The confrontation seems to have been very bitter, with a substantial rigidification on both sides; Ammassari rejected their challenges and the companies

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repeated their arguments. The meeting--which ended with grim faces and a pledge to meet again next Thursday--was summarized by representatives of petroleum companies as "interlocutory."

The Director-General of Energy Sources on the other hand was less tight-lipped in the course of an interview which he gave us at the end of a meeting.

Here, in summary, is what he told us.

[Question] Now, Professor Ammassari, is this really an arm wrestling contest?

[Answer] Let us say, as one of the oil company representatives said, that we are on a collision course.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because crude is already lacking when it comes to the decisions of the producer countries and we cannot accept a situation where other distorting elements are added, elements which will further reduce the oil available to Italy. The shortage during the first half of the year was made up with unsold stocks but now there are no longer any unsold stocks. We must be very careful and on the alert.

[Question] Are we then going to have a gasoline shortage this summer?

[Answer] No, in the light of the checks which we made--providing, of course, consumption does not go up further--we ought to have enough gasoline for ourselves and for the anticipated tourist influx. But the thing that worries us seriously is the gas-oil and fuel oil situation. For these products, the situation is grave especially following the price established in the United States for these supplies. We asked the oil companies for further clarification.

[Question] And this is what you called them in for?

[Answer] More or less. I summoned the representatives of the nine oil companies operating on our market by direction of the minister and I explained to them the supply situation on the basis of a check on the 1971 plan regarding the second half.

[Question] And you did not talk about the step taken to block 35 percent of the processing volume for foreign orders in Italy?

[Answer] That, too. As for the rest, protests have reached the Ministry in recent days, I might almost say threats, in connection with this step which became necessary in order to guarantee sufficient quantities of products for Italy, pending verification of the supply plan and also taking into account a vast effort on the international petroleum byproducts purchasing market which sprang from a decision by the United States Government.

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[Question] The decision to subsidize the import of diesel fuel with \$5 per barrel?

[Answer] Not just that. I am talking here first of all about the decision that no longer prevents the participation of the American companies in cash transactions on the world crude market. This decision conflicted with what the United States representatives asserted afterward to the International Energy Agency during the 21 and 22 May meeting. After that came another American decision, the decision to subsidize diesel fuel imports. This in practice meant that the United States was prepared to pay 30 lire more per kilogram of diesel fuel than the international price at the moment. And, as everybody knows, these two steps caused the Ministry of Industry in Paris to adopt a formal position.

[Question] Professor, let us get back for a moment to today's meeting. What statistics did you show the companies?

[Answer] The data I illustrated this morning unequivocally point to a reduction in the shipments of crude during the second half of 1979 to supply the domestic market and, on the other hand, they also point to a further increase in processing for foreign orders. In the light of these data, the ministry could only take the steps it took, and the decision was painful enough.

[Question] Can you give me those data?

[Answer] No, but I presented them very clearly to the oil companies which perhaps were not too familiar with them. The decision that was made however is aimed at those operators who expect to reduce the final processing volume by doubling or tripling the volume processed for the foreign client.

[Question] But the companies say that this decision will damage Italy, diverting abroad certain processing that can be done in Italy.

[Answer] This morning I recalled that the ministry knows very well that Italy has twice the refining capacity it needs for domestic consumption and that there is no intention not to run the refineries and cause unemployment. In November 1978, when the supply plan was drawn up, after assuring the coverage of our complete domestic needs, we allowed the operators to double the processing volume of last year for foreign customers, increasing the figure to 22 million tons.

[Question] And now things have changed?

[Answer] Now, regarding the second half of the year, compared to a final processing volume of 45.5 million tons and a gap of 8 million tons when it comes to meeting domestic needs completely, we would be increasing the foreign client account to 16 million tons. This means that the Italian refineries would allocate 25 percent of the volume processed for exports without first having taken care of the domestic need.

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[Question] Professor Ammassari, is this not a bit of confusion due to a question of inadequate full prices?

[Answer] It may also be that the current system that has been agreed upon, with the same companies, might work well in a situation of calm international prices whereas in a system that is in motion, such as the present one and following the American decisions, the companies are forced to sell on markets where the best prices can be gotten.

[Question] In other words, the action of the companies is justified, at least from the strictly economic viewpoint?

[Answer] It is clear that, the more money they make, the better for them. But this is not just a question of profits; there are also some specific responsibilities involved here.

They derive from the refining licenses which impose certain supply obligations and which mean that one must comply with commitments undertaken, I want to say again that the most startling thing in all this is that the crude, that is subjected to final processing, keeps going down, while there is an enormous increase in the processing for foreign clients. This is something which a ministry that is concerned with energy sources cannot put up with.

[Question] In summary, you are determined to hold fast in this arm wrestling contest?

[Answer] We will see what happens next Thursday after the companies have more carefully studied the data I brought to their attention.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PROSPECTIVE ENERGY CONSERVATION MEASURES DISCUSSED

Milan IL SOLE - 24 ORE in Italian 9 Jun 79 pp 1, 2

[Article by C.A.: "The Coming Accounting for Energy Savings"]

[Text] Rome. Amid the big hullabaloo that broke out in connection with the "suspense novel" represented by petroleum supplies, the famous "Nicolazzi Plan" for energy savings slowing drifted into the background as was perhaps suggested (to the politicians) by the upcoming elections. Next Sunday, we vote for Europe and on Monday the country will again find itself facing its own real problems.

It may therefore be useful, on the basis of precise information obtained from the Ministry of Industry, to take a look at a group of measures which, in the longer or shorter run, will have to be passed.

These steps can be divided into two separate categories. In the first category we have the more unpleasant and unpopular ones although they will probably be more decisive. They include the revision of petroleum product prices and electric power rates. The CIPE [Inter Ministerial Committee for Economic Planning] or the new parliament will have to express itself and we can therefore anticipate a relatively long interval of time.

In the second category, for which we have more precise information, we on the other hand have adequate administrative provisions and the procedures therefore are simpler. Here is what we can look forward to.

Coal. The replacement of growing quantities of fuel oil with coal is the measure in which the Ministry of Industry is presently placing its greatest hopes when it comes to achieving a considerably savings by the end of the year.

Most of this operation naturally is handled by ENEL [National Electric Power Agency] which is already converting some electric power plants. But the electric power agency and the Ministry of Industry are not completely in on the quantity as such. ENEL experts maintain that they can almost certainly increase the total coal consumption from 2 million tons in 1978 to 2.8-3 million tons in 1979 with a saving of about 700,000 tons of

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petroleum products. The Ministry of Industry on the other hand maintains that it had committed the ENEL to increase its coal consumption to 3.5 million tons during 1979.

Speed limits. Right after Easter, Minister Compagna approved a provision (the only one introduced so far) to limit the speed of truck-trailer combinations to 80 kilometers per hour. The Minister of Public Works noted that this step was not taken to reduce consumption "but to reduce highway deaths."

In addition to this by no means negligible result, it would also be possible, according to the Ministry of Industry, to achieve a saving of about 100,000 liters of gasoline. Concerning speed limits on the other hand, we do not know anything as yet.

Supply of gasoline at border. This provision (no more than half a tank for outgoing truck-trailer combinations) is also administrative in nature and is intended to reduce the now widespread habit of foreign truckers to fill up their tanks in Italy (where gasoline is considerably cheaper) before crossing the border. According to Ministry sources, this measure could be approved by next week, resulting in a saving of about 60,000 tons.

Parking ban in historical areas. This step will certainly be a difficult one since--after the CIPE has issued the necessary directive--the local administrations will have to deliberate on it.

Extension of summertime. This measure has been approved and, starting in 1980 summertime will be extended to six months (saving of 60,000 tons).

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

PREMIER SUAREZ BECOMING MORE AND MORE ISOLATED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 pp 30, 31

[Text] Silence of Suarez

The silence of Suarez has much to do with a style of governing, whose roots go deep down into the furrow of the most recent past; with a manner and a profession that the government, politicians, the press and the whole country are learning day by day: to live in democracy and with a certain, hidden inclination toward perpetuity in office that, according to sources in the UCD [Democratic Center Union] itself, is imparting a strong character to the prime minister.

Nevertheless, that silence brought this mud. The recent terrorist assaults, the feeling of inactivity and paralysis given to the country by the government of Prime Minister Suarez, the problem of autonomy and the already very much discussed economic crisis have succeeded in casting doubt on what seemed to be unquestionable: the figure of Adolfo Suarez himself, of "Uncle Adolfo" as he is known in UCD circles.

Is Suarez irreplaceable? Is he capable of tackling the three great problems confronting the country -- namely, terrorism and law and order, autonomies and constitutional development and economic crisis -- with reasonable capability of solving them?

Jose Luis Gutierrez conducted research in the areas of the government and the center party and wrote the history.

"This is going to the dogs. It is intolerable." This comment, halfway between irritation and pessimism, was made by a well-known UCD member of Parliament, after the Perez Llorca storm.

And the discouragement of this deputy can be detected in broad areas of the government party. The country's situation, described recently as "serious" by the minister of Interior, is described, within the UCD, as "grave, tending to become worse." And everyone is looking toward "Uncle Adolfo."

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"Ever since Suarez has been in office," an important UCD member of Parliament pointed out to this periodical, "he has always given priority to urgent matters over important matters, perhaps obliged in part but the march of events. But I believe that long-range planning is necessary and that is what Suarez has not done. Government has been conducted in a way very similar to Franco's way, with the same tricks, and the ministers have been and are mere department heads but with large offices. They are not aware of what is happening, when they should be jointly responsible for an earnest, well-constructed government policy. Cabinet meetings are nothing more than a mere authentication of what is approved in the committee of under secretaries."

According to all the sources, the progressive isolation of Suarez to a constantly smaller circle of trusted men began in the leaks from cabinet meetings in the first Suarez government.

The prime minister is especially sensitive to two topics that he handles with much tact: relations with the military and criticisms of his administration. "Leaks," the UCD member of Parliament stated, "make him extremely nervous and he no longer trusts anyone. His manner of governing the country is constantly more autocratic and personal, without relying on anyone." In this respect, the commentators recall the appointment by designation of the new national secretariat of UCD by Adolfo Suarez, at the end of May this year, in strong contrast with the democratic debates of the 28th congress of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], held at the same time.

Too Many Problems

In view of the events piling up, this question arises bothersomely: What is Suarez doing? Does the "Suarez paralysis" really exist?

Broad areas of the center party agree in stating that "the suit is too big for Suarez," problems are too much for him.

In those circles, his extreme skill in piloting the transition is pointed out, but also "his indecision when the time came to govern really, when strong measures have to be taken."

"Undoubtedly," a high UCD figure stated, "Suarez has glued himself to his chair in the prime minister's office and everything he does is for the purpose of staying there. But the present moment is sufficiently grave and, therefore, a statesman is needed at the head of the country. Let us hope that the prime minister will react. He has a great reaction capability and it increases when faced with difficult situations, and this one certainly is difficult."

What if he does not react? Last week, several opinions mentioning the prime minister's "stability" appeared in some Madrid newspapers.

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According to these judgments, Suarez will be around awhile. In his speech in the congress on 30 May, the prime minister himself leaked a dazzling message in a veiled manner in his speech: Either Suarez or chaos.

The prime minister's inconstancy in identifying his figure with the democratic order is systematically taken apart by a number of representatives of the center party who state that a replacement of the prime minister should come from the party itself.

"It is neither real nor well to trot out the ghost of a military coup in the most crucial moments," a well-known UCD member of Parliament stated to this periodical. "The party, the system would take charge of producing a substitute, in case Suarez fails. Otherwise, the party or the system would be replaced."

Thus, the possible replacement of Suarez, a rumor that began to spread some weeks ago in very limited circles and always in whispers, leaped openly to the pages of newspapers and to political commentaries. On the party level, very timidly, meetings, suppers and informal dinners are taking place with groups in which "nothing important is talked about," always according to the participants.

Nevertheless, the names of possible replacements have already appeared in print and even with photographs. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo -- whose maximum endorsement for being selected for the post is said, according to some sources, to be the fact that he does not belong to any of the three trends -- is one of those most mentioned, like Rodolfo Martin Villa, Ordenez, or Landelino Lavilla himself.

But it seems that the phase of replacement of Suarez is, for the present, only a dream by many or wishful thinking -- confusing desires with realities -- by others.

"It is impossible to do without Suarez," a well-known representative of the social-democrat wing pointed out. Aside from the fact that legally it is very difficult to do (a vote of censure would have to occur and the PSOE and Democratic Coalition would have to come to an agreement, together with the Communist Party, or the whole parliamentary group of UCD would have to decide it in full, which seems still less possible) politically it would be a catastrophe, because the UCD would break up into seven pieces. Suarez is irreplaceable at this time. That is one thing and what is done with this strong government is something else. Giving a new reading to problems, stirring up the enthusiasm and solidarity of every sector in the country, something that is not happening now. Coming out of the leadership crisis being undergone by UCD and the government."

In addition, center sources indicated another impossibility for replacing Suarez: there are no candidates. "Suarez," a representative of the Christian democratic sector of UCD stated, "has been very careful that there is

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no one who can cast a shadow on him. Thus, the party has no 'number two,' or even a 'number three,' because he has eliminated the figures of stature who might have been these numbers. Only 'number fours' are left."

The center politicians added: "The figure of Garrigues is among the possible replacements, but his delicate health does not make this advisable. Calvo Sotelo seems to me entirely unrepresentable. He has done nothing as a minister. He has no political past and when he prepared the first UCD tickets for the 15 June election, he had the strange skill of confronting everyone."

Fernandez Ordonez is being regarded, nevertheless, as a more certain value, although he raises the disadvantage of the rejection caused by his figure in certain sectors of the right in this country. However, as some party sources point out, "it would have been worse for the PSOE to have won the election, and if they had won, they would be governing."

Rodolfo Martin Villa does not appear to be a firm candidate, because of his abraded image as minister of Interior, and Landelino Lavilla seems to be completely withdrawn from the most turbulent centers.

Protecting Suarez

Every UCD sector agrees, however, on stating that "there is no other solution than to protect Suarez, to oblige him to govern and to govern in a more collegial manner."

There are disagreements, however, on how to govern. Thus, some party sectors show an inclination to support a strengthening of the government based on strengthening the party, "which practically does not exist now," with a secretary general who will be one in fact.

"It is not wise," one of the spokesmen of this sector added, "to make a change in government at present, a few months after its appointment. The government must be strengthened on the basis of a strong party."

The supporters of this point of view are considering Rodolfo Martin Villa as secretary general of UCD and the establishment of a standing committee of the Executive Committee, consisting of eight or ten persons on whom the highest political responsibilities will be incumbent for the party leadership and the government line.

Nevertheless, the possibility that the situation may deteriorate and that things may even become aggravated and worse make the replacement of Suarez continue there, in a chrysalis state, in broad sectors of the center party.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

DECISIVE ACTION ON TERRORISM ASKED OF GOVERNMENT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Jun 79 p 3

[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "Consensus or Nonsense"]

[Text] Perhaps Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez is not under a table worried over the number and size of the problems that must be solved by his government, but an increasing part of the political class and of the country's informed opinion feels that this is so. An increasing outcry is springing up for Suarez to govern, for him to establish definite objectives in the country's three great problems and for him to indicate time limits and ways for achieving them.

If Adolfo Suarez resorts exclusively to his unquestionable tactical ability, erosion of the government will ensue very rapidly. During the first years of the transition, the strategic objective -- achievement of a constitution accepted by the immense majority -- was so clear that the tactical capability of Adolfo Suarez sufficed and was more than enough to keep the country's confidence in spite of the destabilizing campaign that fell down on us and the economic crisis that acted independently. But when the Constitution was approved, the medium-term strategic objective disappeared and there is no tactical preciosity that will free the country of its anxieties. Without telling us clearly where we are going in these four years lying ahead of us, each assassination, each act of savagery, each strike and each business failure make the country quiver down to the marrow.

A magic panacea is beginning to appear in these days: let us return to consensus with the left. With a lack of government, it seems that we return to consensus.

Unfortunately, gentlemen, the course of consensus with the left is not the right course for the country. Perhaps no other remedy is left, but first of all an attempt must be made to govern in accordance with the mandate received from the voters on 1 March, firmly and fearlessly. And only later, only if it is demonstrated that a center party governing firmly is not capable of completing the strengthening of the new regime, only in that case

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would the country understand that we should again sing ambiguous songs all together, in union, in order not to have to sign by force the heroic blue anthems already on the decline.

It is an admission in advance that the government does not want to govern, if the phantom of consensus is resuscitated now. The argument that the Suarez Administration does not have an absolute majority in Parliament is not valid. The problem is how to achieve that majority. It may be achieved "unnaturally" by making a pact with the left, but it may also be achieved, with much greater consistency, by rapidly establishing the autonomy statutes without pettiness and then by coming to an agreement with the Catalonians and the Basques on a moderate program of government that will have almost 200 deputies in the Chamber. This alternative is as possible as consensus with the left, but much more consistent and better for the country.

That kind of government, with Basques and Catalonians represented in it, would be capable of settling the economic crisis from an overall liberal point of view and it would be capable of undertaking, day by day, blow by blow, the very great task of building the new state. Moreover, the Socialist Party, placed as opposition to this government, would come out of its ambiguity and its Marxist madness to prepare, also day by day, blow by blow, its own concrete government alternative. Thus, in 1983, Spaniards could choose between two concrete, complete government programs. That is the course. That is the strategy.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

GONZALEZ INTERVIEWED, DISCUSSES PARTY'S SITUATION

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 24 Jun 79 pp 39-41 LD

[Interview with former Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) Secretary General Felipe Gonzalez by Lorenza de Azcarraga, first published by Mexican magazine EXCELSIOR: "Felipe Speaks"--date and place not specified]

[Text] A few weeks after the 28th PSOE Congress split the country's oldest party into two opposed wings, the new democracy's foremost socialist leader agreed to an in-depth interview with a journalist.

This magazine has secured exclusive publishing rights in Spain for the interview between Felipe Gonzalez and Lorenza de Azcarraga for the Mexican magazine EXCELSIOR.

Question: You resigned for ethical reasons, but a large proportion of the party believes that it was an irresponsible move. What would you say to me about that charge?

Answer: Well, I have not carried out any opinion polls to find out whether a large proportion of the country believes that my resignation was inconsistent, but I am still subject to a popular tribunal, so that when the next elections come we will see if indeed there has been a negative or a positive reaction.

Question: Did the debate for and against Marxism serve to hide the grass roots' irritation with the leadership?

Answer: Well, I believe that there is always a degree of aggressiveness on the part of the party grass roots toward the leadership; there has always been some throughout the party's history at all the congresses and during this period also, and it has been increased, if you like, by a party grass roots which has grown ten-fold during my period in office and which we have managed to integrate into active participation in political decisions. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this means that the debate on Marxism was used in any way to bring this aggressiveness to the surface [hacer aflorar esa agresividad, possible misprint for hacer aflojar...to weaken] in any case the issue of Marxism was fundamental to the congress.

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Question: Do you believe that your party is sufficiently responsible to take charge of this country's future after the contradictions of the congress?

Answer: Obviously I do believe so and I believe it after the congress just as much as I did before, because it has been the only party capable of publicly discussing its internal differences and discussing them quite freely. Usually a political party's responsibility is confused with its ability to conceal its internal problems. I still believe that of all the parties in the country it is the one least unfit to take charge of the country's future.

Question: It is also said that the party slipped from your hands. Do you believe that you are sufficiently capable to lead a country of 36 million people, with its economic crisis, terrorism...?

Answer: Well, I must not be the judge of myself, but in any case even the opinion that the party slipped from my hands depends on one's view of political action. Of course, if one regards it as rigid control activity over a party's progress and dynamics, then in fact it did not slip from my hands; the fact is that I never tried to control it. The party has its own life and must do so increasingly.

If the implication is that I did not have sufficient support from the congress, I do not believe that in truth: the executive received the votes of almost 70 percent of the members, with only 10 percent against and 30 percent abstaining [as published]. Therefore, there was only 10 percent real opposition to the party leadership and to me personally, if you want to make it personal, then there was no voting to appoint a candidate, but it seems that some of the comrades who formed the opposition nucleus have stated publicly that they were aware that 90 percent would have elected me secretary general.

Question: Who will win at the next congress? Could there be an understanding between the hard line and the moderate?

Answer: Well, if I represent the hard line and the rest represent the moderate line, I hope that there is an understanding, but I believe that is not the point: a cliché has been coined which does not in any way correspond to the facts of the matter. I believe that the party could, and should, be more radical in its socioeconomic approach to socioeconomic and cultural transformations and more vigorous in its ideological and theoretical pronouncements so that what it says may be brought more into line with what it does, so that there is no violent discrepancy between what it says it wants and what it is prepared to do in the country. I believe that more progress must be made along the path of social transformations and that there should be less shouting. This has always been my stance.

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Question: Could there be another secretary general?

Answer: Obviously, there could be another. Somebody said rightly that this party lived 100 years without Felipe Gonzalez and can live another 100 years without him, fortunately for the party and for the country.

Question: Who could it be?

Answer: I do not yet have any candidate.

Question: This is what Tierno Galvan [PSOE honorary chairman] told me. Is it true that Tierno Galvan supported you unconditionally during the latest crisis?

Answer: Well. The only point I would make is that on the Sunday morning, when I have already decided not to stand, Tierno offered to support me.

Question: What was the content of your latest conversation with [Prime Minister] Suarez and what kind of relations do you have with him?

Answer: Relations are not as good as they were before. As far as I am concerned, the question of whether relations between the prime minister and our party, as an opposition party, are good or bad immediately places an assessment of personal relations on a subordinate level, when the country has to deal with the grave problems which it can experience from time to time. Therefore, irrespective of how good or bad relations are, I will always be willing to discuss the country's grave problems. And as for the content, I must be discreet. The press has said certain things that are not true: in order to reestablish the truth I must say that it was at the government's initiative and that I had the administrative committee's authorization to meet with the prime minister and that the basic content was the domestic political situation and certain aspects of foreign policy: I can say no more.

Question: Do you believe that the PSOE would be in a better position to end terrorism than the government?

Answer: This is a terribly difficult question to answer. I do not believe--and I have said this in the Cortes--that anybody should be as demagogic as to stand up in the congress of deputies and guarantee that he will put an end to terrorism within a specified time limit. As long as there is an assassin in the street prepared to kill anyone wearing a uniform, then that assassin is difficult to control. But I do believe that the struggle against terrorism is sometimes viewed from different philosophical standpoints.

Nevertheless, there is a precondition, and that is efficiency, technical preparation. The availability of large resources and in some cases a series of political measures--as could happen in the case of the terrorism

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in the Basque country--the ETA terrorism, in other words. It is not easy to combine this series of preconditions, especially when there is no heritage of adequate preparation for dealing with these aspects from a democratic standpoint.

Question: Do you believe that the present government will last the expected 4 years, because many people are saying that it will not last, or is there likely to be a coalition government with the PSOE before 1983?

Answer: Well, I would say that after the elections the first indication I gave was that I believed that the government should last, because democracy is weakened when elections are brought forward.

I now have the impression that the government will experience great difficulties in lasting the course. I say "will experience"; and I also have the personal impression that it will be difficult to establish a coalition government of any kind.

From a personal viewpoint, I would say that only if the democratic institutions were in danger would I personally advise any kind of measure, including government participation. But naturally it is the party that must assess the danger, not in any way the interlocutor on the other side.

Question: What conditions would the PSOE set on a coalition, if one were to be formed?

Answer: I believe it is premature to make any assessment of this kind. In the event of a coalition being suggested, it would be because there was a serious institutional danger and if there is a serious institutional danger, conditions become of secondary importance, because what would be at stake would be to save democracy, though probably and logically there would be conditions: they would, however, become subordinate.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON PSOE'S IDEOLOGICAL PURITY

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Jun 79 p 3

[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas: "PSOE or PSUE?"]

[Text] A minority of illuminati, tacitly joined by malcontented of every kind in the party, has attempted -- thus, neither more nor less -- to usurp the will of the 5 million Spaniards who voted, 3 months ago, for a socialist alternative in this country, as was presented popularly by Felipe Gonzalez. Marxists and young persons of every color set themselves up as an opposition bordering on psychiatric and they threaten to tear to shreds that great hope raised scarcely 2 years ago by Spanish socialism. Down with Felipe, because without Felipe we shall lose better.

The fact is that without Felipe, without that image of modern socialism that he has been able to offer the country, the pure and hard PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] can be sure that it will not even win over Carrillo in elections. For better or for worse, whether or not they like it, the pure ideology ayatollahs in this country will find scant echo. Felipe, or the image given by Felipe, is worth millions of voters. The Marxists, or the image that the opponents have given to Felipe, make no comparison with Carrillo.

PSUE [Spanish Unified Socialist Party] or PSOE, that is the question. The left wing of the socialist party is trying to fight against Carrillo on his ground by passing him on the left, by winning the heaven of the prophet Marx. It is possible to win heaven with that strategy. What is certain is that every election will be lost, one after the other. And what is likely is that the battle against the very clever communist Santiago Carrillo will be lost. Spain's recent history is full of puritan, Marxist and Leninist groups by the basketful who almost always wound up by confessing their sins and modestly entering the Mecca of the Communist Party that cleanses all minds and swallows up its children who have gone astray. Either that, or the solitary, happy puritanism of the four cats purer than anyone and more lonely than anyone.

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Here, among us, if elections were to be held immediately and Bustelo, Solana and Castellano were to head the PSOE ticket, if no one else entered the races, the UCD [Democratic Center Union] would achieve a bold majority of the popular vote and an overwhelming majority in the legislative chambers. Pure, pure, solitary like hermits. Either solitude or be absorbed by Carrillo in a new and glorious Spanish Unified Socialist Party (PSUE).

Something sounded hollow in that brilliant socialist party of Felipe that, therefore, never was equal to the occasion, either in the Canary Islands, or in the Basque Country, or in the real country. There was brilliance on top and much demagoguery or much dissatisfaction below. And now it has been seen why. Because a very profound crisis between the illuminati and the politicians was eating away the very marrow of the new great party that was reborn 2 years ago. And now the moment of truth has arrived. The crisis opened by Felipe Gonzalez makes it possible to discuss thoroughly what is desired to do with the traditional Spanish socialist party. Either it becomes a minority party on the tail of the PCE, or it becomes a great party capable of looking at the 20th century in the face and, if you press me, even the 21st century. It is not clear which of the two options is going to win out. What does appear safe is that the crisis has become public and an end is being put to an ambiguous situation that manipulated objectively voters of good faith who would never have voted for the Marxist-like radical ideas that had the majority in the socialist congress. The two wings -- Felipe on the one hand and the purists on the other -- deceived the country objectively and it is well for them to come to an agreement with each other or to separate once and for all. There is a great 6-month battle and we shall know who won only at the end.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

COMMENTARY REFLECTS ON PSOE INTERNAL CONFLICT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Jun 79 p 21

[Article by Jose Oneto: "Felipe (Gonzalez)"]

[Text] Among the tears of the men on the Executive Board who succeeded in making of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] a real alternative in government authority, in a dramatic silence that all Spain was able to perceive by means of the direct broadcast by Radio Nacional, with fear visible on the faces of those who had brought about the "great tragedy," Felipe Gonzalez Marquez announced, last week, that he could not run for reelection as secretary general of the party, because it was running counter to his own ethics.

Felipe Gonzalez, who is not a Marxist, who does not believe that Marxism is his party's alternative, who has personally had the courage to state publicly that he prefers to die knifed in New York's Harlem than to live miserably in the Soviet Union, has believed that the definition that emerged from the 28th congress of the PSOE (a Marxist, classist, mass and federal party) is inconsistent with a model of a modern socialist society (his concept of society) and he has decided to resign as secretary general of the party. Gonzalez, without whose collaboration the political transition that occurred in this country in 3 dramatic years would not have been possible, has given a proof of honesty and ethics that caused surprise even outside Spain.

His party, a party that was about to come into office on 1 March and that succeeded in defeating UCD [Democratic Center Union] in the April municipal elections owing to the activity of Gonzalez and the resigning Executive Board, has, nevertheless, demonstrated so much immaturity, revolutionary infantilism, and function as a university assembly under Franco that recovery of credibility is going to cost much.

In the PSOE congress, a congress governed by freedom and open doors like none of the congresses held in Spain, serious proposals were made, but the serious proposals were flooded by pseudorevolutionary verbosity and by an

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infantilism that should serve as an example to the leaders of the party of Pablo Iglesias. There were those who advocated the "physical annihilation of the bourgeoisie." There were those who proposed that ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] be recognized as a national liberation movement. There were those who advocated transferring the United Nations to Ibiza.

There were, in the PSOE congress, very worthy groups of delegates with an irreproachable democratic trajectory, but there also were many delegates who sang "Cara al Sol" up to 4 years ago, who wore the blue shirt, who received political patronage from the Franco regime and who now are farther to the left than anyone.

With these political proposals, with this mixture of a party that has grown excessively and that has been used as baptism for crossing the Jordan of democracy, with the large number of persons infiltrated in the PSOE, with the tensions caused in every province by the makeup of the tickets for the general and municipal elections, with the radicalism of some of the bases used, the result of the congress could not be any different.

Felipe Gonzalez, who had a historic opportunity, 3 years ago in the first general elections, to make a party that would meet the demand of 5 million voters, as Francois Mitterrand recommended to him, chose, at that time, the easy road of a spirit of victory. Now, with a historic decision that shows his stature as a man with ethics and as a statesman, he has not wanted to play the game of those who want to make revolution right in the middle of industrial civilization and in southern Europe.

Felipe and the Executive Board that has resigned will try to continue to guide the party from the socialist parliamentary group, while an emergency management committee will handle matters of procedure and administration. Gonzalez and the Seville group will try, in a few months, to take over control again of the apparatus of a party that will declare itself neither Marxist or classist in the next special congress. But it is certain that, if the attempt fails, Felipe Gonzalez -- and he has already demonstrated it -- will go back home for the tragedy of Spanish socialism.

The outgoing secretary general of the PSOE has little time for this operation. With a country constantly more disillusioned that sees the spectacle of a government that does not govern, a chairman of the executive committee that seems to be paralyzed, a socialist opposition that wants to make revolution and not come into office and even where prominent gentlemen fight violently for the bars of a banner that does not exist up to now, time is running out.

Therefore, the special congress must be held as soon as possible, not only for the good of the PSOE, but also for the good of the country

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

MILITARY BUDGET STUDIED, COMMENTED UPON

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Apr 79 pp 54-55

[Text] A prominent person, who for the time being has not yet signed any article in DEFENSA but who, we hope, will do so in the near future, describes this analysis on the Spanish defense budget as "disquisitions at the average citizen level." We believe that it will be of interest to our readers.

Last November, Fernandez Ordonez submitted the general budget of the state for 1979 to Parliament and subsequently to the press and public opinion.

The minister stressed the first attempt by State Administration to prepare a budget "by programs." This placed us, he said, on a par with the most advanced European countries in this matter. Perhaps it would have been desirable to make a concrete reference to the departments that initiated this new administrative method.

The daily press, in turn, has been giving in detail several summaries of the budget for certain departments, which, like Education and Science and Defense, represent substantial items in the total public expenditure and are attracting the attention, at present, of a broad sector of the country.

I am sure that the summary by items appearing in the press and copied below suggests not a few questions to the man in the street at the present time.

The section on "obligations to be paid off" is clear in meaning and has a precise correlation in the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The Army reports the staff unilaterally, while this body exists in the three branches of the Armed Forces.

The Army refers to General Services, assigning them to the organization responsible for their administration (Directorate General). The Navy makes

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reference exclusively to General Services, while these expenditures are not reported in any way in the Air Force. In the Air Force, on the other hand, there are expenditures reported as "economic matters," certainly paradoxical in budgets in which everything is "economic."

The clear item of "personnel expenditures" shows up considered by the Army and the Air Force, while the Navy handles it under the heading of "Personnel Department." This leads to the belief that included under this heading are both "personnel expenditures" and expenditures for organization (Department). This interpretation would enable us to correlate the total figure with the figure resulting from adding the items for "Office of Chief of Personnel" and "Personnel Command," respectively, to the "personnel expenditures" item in the Army and the Air Force.

The Army lists a final item of "Office of the Chief of Logistic Support" that is expressed in the same way in the Navy and that the Air Force does not mention. With regard to the remaining items for the Navy and the Air Force, it can be suspected that the Army has lumped the expenditure together (at least in the form presented by the press), while the Navy gives greater detail (Bureau of Naval Construction, Supply and Transportation and Research and Development) and the Air Force reports the Materiel Command and Air Infrastructure.

Finally, in the Navy, there is a singular, broad heading of "General Supply Bureau," possibly correlated either with the personnel item or the logistics item, because of some of their special components.

In mentioning specifically for the Navy three organizations participating in logistics like Naval Construction, Supply and Transportation and Research and Development, while the Air Force speaks of Materiel and of Air Infrastructure and no subordinate bodies are reported in the Army, it is not possible to go beyond some possible questions like whether only the Navy engages in research and development, or whether the Army does not consider infrastructure at the chief's office (or bureau) level.

The simple, brief remarks made above raise, nevertheless, serious doubts on the rationality, arrangement and proper parallelism of this budget, which is certainly "traditional" in its form and not very suitable for a clear, transparent analysis by each of the groups concerned in the country. Aspects like designations themselves, levels of organs and structures, should be considered with closer and similar criteria, by eliminating past stages of excessive compartmentation and particularism.

Aside from the foregoing general remarks and eliminating the structural shortcomings of the budget, another kind of remarks can be made by means of which the average "little Spaniard" might guess the degree of participation by each branch of the Armed Forces in the overall outlay, a topic that is being aired and commented on more and more in various sectors of the country.

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In this connection, the overall expenditure figures by Armed Forces branch are a first, important detail. These figures are (still in accordance with the summary below) approximately 130,000 million for the Army, 54,000 million for the Navy and 49,000 million for the Air Force. In other words, the percentages are 55.7 percent, 23.1 percent and 21.0 percent, respectively.

Of these figures, the personnel expenditures, by their double heading "Personnel Expenditures" and "Organization Expenditures," are 57.4, 37.9 and 49.0 percent, respectively. This brings out clearly the differences in contribution to the overall expenditure for this item in the Army, Navy and Air Force. Undoubtedly, the "quantitative" factor prevails in this initial correlation of expenditures.

With regard to the other large block of expenditures, Logistics expenditures, grouped in the same way as indicated above, yield percentages of participation in the overall expenditures of each Armed Forces branch of 30.5 percent for the Army, 60.0 percent for the Navy and 43.0 percent for the Air Force. These figures are again significant, not only because of their size, but also with regard to the complexity and scarcity of support activities in each branch of the Armed Forces. In this connection, the Navy is close to normal values of expenditure distribution, between Personnel (40 percent) and Materiel (60 percent). The Army is far from this distribution and in the Air Force the separation has a negative sign.

The average citizen can ascertain, from this simple analysis, even disregarding the "contingency funds" allocated to each Armed Forces branch, a clear "separation" of the Air Force in the present amount of the joint outlay, without necessarily implying a judgment on the value of Spain's present strategy, although it certainly reflects treatment different from other European countries and in clear disagreement with the role assigned at present to the Air Force in foreseeable future conflicts and in the development of a "deterrent" capability, of fast, effective reply.

[Table on next page]

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Summary of Expenditures

Defense

Ministry, Subsecretariat and General Services	1,009,445,000
Higher Defense Data Center	579,525,000
Total	1,588,970,000

Army

Obligations to be paid off	11,254,597,000
Army Staff	3,119,602,000
Directorate General of General Services	972,160,000
Office of Chief of Personnel	1,943,475,000
Office of Chief of Logistic Support	40,342,932,000
Personnel Expenditures	72,704,980,000
Total	130,337,746,000

Navy

Obligations to be paid off	258,773,000
General Services	3,106,000
Personnel Department	20,492,824,000
Office of Chief of Logistic Support	470,000,000
Bureau of Naval Military Construction	23,253,300,000
Supply and Transportation	8,700,331,000
Research and development	17,000,000
General Supply Bureau	855,948,000
Total	54,046,282,000

Air Force

Obligations to be paid off	435,887,000
Air Force Economic Matters	3,413,104,000
Personnel Expenditures	22,943,072,000
Personnel Command	1,159,230,000
Materiel Command	10,120,565,000
Air infrastructure	1,022,252,000
Total	49,094,110,000

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